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LIS! (31 : PARI IES I O 1 1 IE PROCEEDINGS 
All parties are listed in the caption of the case. Defendant/Appellee South Jordan 
City (the "City") refers to Plaintiffs/Appellants, collectively herein as "Plaintiffs.5' 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over the first issue Plaintiffs raise 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the district court correctly held that when a municipality has in fact 
decided the issues Plaintiffs raise, Plaintiffs' characterization of their suit as an 
"enforcement action" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1002 does not avoid the 
limitations applicable to appeal of a municipality's land use decisions set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-9-1001. The district court's decision construing the statutes presents a 
question of law which diis Court reviews for correctness. State ex rel. Div. of Forestry 
Fire & State Lands v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, P8, 44 P.3d 680. 
2. Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions on appeal, this Court cannot reverse and 
remand on the question whether die district court erred in "denying Appellants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment" because the district court rendered no judgment on that issue: 
"[Bjased on the untimeliness of plaintiffs' petition for review, defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss is hereby granted. Accordingly because plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment is moot, the Court declines to address that motion further." (R. 300; 303-04.) 
Were this Court inclined to address the issue raised by Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment without the benefit of the district court's prior review, the issue 
presented would be whether the City properly applied and interpreted its zoning 
ordinances in approving a site plan allowing for a parking structure within the Jordan 
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River corridor, which presented mixed questions of fact and law. "A municipality's land 
use decisions are entitled to a great deal of deference35 (Springville Citizens for a Better 
Comnuuiitv v. City of Springville, 199 UT 25, 11 23, 979 P.2d 332, 336), and the Court 
should reverse the decision at issue in this case only if it is not supported by substantial 
evidence. Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
10-9-1001. Appeals. 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use decisions 
made under this chapter or under the regulation made under authority of this 
chapter until that person has exhausted his administrative remedies. 
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of the 
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the 
district court within 30 days after the local decision is rendered. 
(b) (i) The time under Subsection (2) (a) to file a petition is tolled from the date a 
property owner files a request for arbitration of a constitutional taking issue with 
the private property ombudsman under Section 63-34-13 until 30 days after: 
(A) the arbitrator issues a final award; or 
(B) the private property ombudsman issues a written statement under 
Subsection 63-34-13(4)(b) declining to arbitrate or to appoint an arbitrator. 
(ii) A tolling under Subsection (2)(b)(i) operates only as to the 
specific constitutional taking issues that are die subject of the request 
for arbitration filed with the private property ombudsman by a 
property owner. 
(iii) A request for arbitration filed with the private property 
ombudsman after the time under Subsection (2) (a) to file a petition 
has expired does not affect the time to file a petition. 
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(3) The courts shall: 
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and 
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
10-9-1002. Enforcement. 
(1) (a) A municipality or any owner of real estate within the municipality in which 
violations of this chapter or ordinances enacted under the authority of this chapter 
occur or are about to occur may in addition to other remedies provided by law, 
institute: 
(i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any other appropriate actions; or 
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful building, 
use, or act. 
(b) A municipality need only establish the violation to obtain the injunction. 
(2) (a) The municipality may enforce die ordinance by withholding building 
permits. 
(b) It is unlawful to erect, construct, reconstruct, alter, or change the use of any 
building or other structure within a municipality without approval of a building 
permit. 
(c) The municipality may not issue a building permit unless the plans of and for the 
proposed erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, or use fully conform to 
all regulations then in effect. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below. 
This case arises from Plaintiffs' disagreement with the City's decision, on 
Februaiy 14, 2001, to approve a site plan proposed for the Riverpark Corporate Center 
("Riverpark Project") by Anderson Development Company ("developer53). (R. 4-9; 12-
20; 28-66.) Plaintiffs contended below and continue to argue here that the site plan is 
3 
"illegal" because it places parking lots in an area designated as a "recreation/open space or 
preservation area[]" on the City's Land Use Map, and because die Master Development 
Agreement ("MDA") between the City and developer requires that the area "should be 
kept clear of buildings and structures." (Id) Plaintiffs argue that the City's initial 
approval of die site plan was mistaken, and when Plaintiffs eventually asserted their claims 
in the summer of 2001, after construction had already commenced, the City should have 
issued stop work orders pursuant to its enforcement authority. (Id.) 
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment requesting the Court to rule 
on their arguments as a matter of law. (R. 96-110.) The City responded to Plaintiffs' 
arguments on the merits, but also filed its own Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that 
Plaintiffs' challenge to the City's land use decision to allow the parking lot was untimely 
and barred by the 30-day time limitation in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001. (R. 204-15.) 
The district court found the City's argument pursuant to § 10-9-1001 to be valid, and 
dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint as untimely. (R. 300; 303-04.) Because the district court 
found Plaintiffs' Complaint was time barred by § 10-9-1001, the court expressly did not 
consider Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment or the arguments on the merits 
of Plaintiffs'claims. (R. 300.) 
B. Statement of Facts. 
The facts relevant to the district court's decision are few and they are undisputed. 
The City sets forth those material facts in 1111 1 through 6, below7. To the extent the Court 
reaches Plaintiffs' second issue, which die district court did not consider, Plaintiffs have 
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failed to point out conflicting evidence in the record supporting die City's decision, and 
the City describes those facts in 1111 7 through 12. 
i. Facts Relevant to the District Court's Decision. 
1. The proposed site plan for the Riverpark Project identifies and describes 
construction of landscaped parking areas within a "River Corridor Area." (R. 5-6, 1120; 
65-66; 218, 118.) 
2. The City's Planning Staff reviewed the proposed site plan and recommended 
it for approval to the City Planning Commission. (R. 219, 1111 10, 11.) 
3. The City Planning Commission then held a public hearing with respect to 
the proposed site plan, and thereafter recommended the site plan for approval to the City 
Council. (Id.) 
4. On February 14, 2001, the City Council held a public hearing with respect 
to the proposed site plan, and thereafter unanimously approved the proposed site plan for 
the Riverpark Project. (R. 5-6, 1120; 78, 1111; 219, 1112.) 
5. On or about July 9, 2001, and after construction had commenced on the 
Riverpark Project pursuant to the approved site plan, Plaintiffs first notified the City of 
their claims concerning the site plan and subject parking lots. (R. 100, 103 115.) 
6. Plaintiffs did not file their Complaint in district court until on or about 
October 4, 2001. (R. 1.) Plaintiffs' Complaint takes issue with the location of the 
parking lots in the "River Corridor area" as originally depicted on the site plan approved 
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by the City Council, and requests that the approval and construction of the lots be 
declared illegal. (R. 6-9.) 
ii. Facts Relevant to the City's Decision to Approve the Site Plan. 
7. City Ordinance 97-7 does not require that die "River Corridor" area 
"continue to be maintained for recreation, open space and preservation uses55 as Plaintiffs 
assert. (Plfs.5 Br. at p. 4 (emphasis added).) Rather, the Ordinance provides that the "100 
year flood plain and meander corridor . . . shall continue to be designated on the [City's] 
Future Land Use Plan Map as recreation/open space or preservation areas.55 (R. 13.) 
8. The City's "recreation/open space55 land use designation, in turn, does not 
preclude parking lots as accessories to uses such as parks, golf courses, equestrian parks, 
etc. (R. 218-19, 1111 6-17.) 
9. The Plaintiffs quote only selectively from the MDA. In addition to those 
portions quoted by Plaintiffs, the MDA provides: 
. . . All buildings or other improvements shall be located 
outside of the river Corridor Area except as approved in 
writing by the City and as provided in this Agreement. . . . 
. . . Some structured parking will be used. All open space 
shall be maintained by a property owners5 association, unless 
otherwise provided herein. The open space areas shall be kept 
free and clear of buildings and structures and are for the 
purpose of providing areas for recreation, trails, view areas, 
drains, canals, wetlands, slope protections, and like matters as 
approved by the City. All areas within the meander corridor 
within the River Corridor Area shall be designed by the 
Master Developer or Developer(s) to provide for landscaping 
to the river, paved pathways for pedestrians/bicycles, picnic 
areas, access to the Jordan river, wetland areas and otiier 
public uses. . . . All parking Jots developed in conjunction 
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with the Project on any portion of the Property or the 
Peterson Property shall be available for public use on 
weekends and after normal business hours. During weekdays, 
a minimum ten (10) parldng spaces will be reserved at all 
times form public use at the north end and south end parldng 
lots within the Project. Additional public parking will be 
permitted on a space available basis during regular business 
hours during the week. 
The obligations of Master Developer and the City set forth in 
his Agreement shall not create any rights in or obligations to any 
other persons or parties except to the extent otherwise provided 
herein. 
(R. 33-34, 53.) 
10. Even assuming Plaintiffs had some rights pursuant to the MDA, the City 
determined that die proposed parking lots sewed the City's recreation and open space 
purposes by providing public parldng for and access to the river corridor and a paved path 
along the corridor, and approved die parldng lots, in writing. (R. 217-20.) 
11. With respect to those portions of the MDA requiring open spaces to be kept 
clear of "buildings'5 and "structures," die City zoning ordinances define a "building,35 as "a 
structure having a roof supported by columns or walls, used or intended to be used for die 
shelter or enclosure of persons, animals, or property;55 and "structure,55 as "[a]ny object or 
building erected or constructed on a lot or parcel which exceeds 6 feet in height or exceeds 
2 feet in height and forms a geometric shape covering a ground area greater dian 30 
square feet.55 (R. 128-33, 207.) 
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12. The City's only decision on the matter approved the site plan with its 
parking lot locations, the City has never found a "violation" of its ordinances, and 
therefore could not, as a factual matter, be "informed" of such violations by Plaintiffs. 
(R. 217-20.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is significant that months prior to Plaintiffs' suit, die developer followed the 
City's ordinances by presenting a proposed site plan to City planning staff, to the City 
Planning Commission, and eventually to the City Council. The site plan clearly showed 
parking lots within areas Plaintiffs argue have been designated as "recreation/open space or 
preservation areas" on the City's Land Use Map, and areas Plaintiffs argue the MDA 
requires "should be kept clear of buildings and structures." The City then approved the 
site plan through a full and complete public approval process, including public hearings 
before the City Planning Commission and the City Council. 
Plaintiffs now mount a collateral attack on this decision by characterizing their 
Complaint raising the same issues addressed in die public review and approval process as 
an "enforcement" action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1002. The District Court 
correctly held that under such circumstances where a municipality has actually made a land 
use "decision" applying the requirements of its' ordinances to the factual conditions which 
plaintiffs assert constitute violations, § 10-9-1002 does not provide an "alternative" remedy 
that allows Plaintiffs to avoid the limitations imposed by § 10-9-1001. To hold otherwise 
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would vitiate the requirements of § 10-9-1001, and render that section of essentially no 
force or effect. 
Plaintiffs' arguments on the second issue they raise are both procedurally and 
substantively flawed. The District Court did not rule on the merits of Plaintiffs' motion 
for summary judgment because it found Plaintiffs' Complaint was untimely and barred by 
§ 10-9-1001. To die extent this Court wishes to consider Plaintiffs' arguments, Plaintiffs 
wholly fail to overcome the presumption of validity the Court must accord the City's land 
use decision because it is plainly supported by the language of the applicable ordinances 
and the MDA which Plaintiffs chose to ignore. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS CANNOT AVOID THE 30-DAY TIME LIMITATION OF 
§ 10-9-1001 BECAUSE THE CITY ACTUALLY DECIDED THE ISSUES 
RAISED IN PLAINTIFFS5 COMPLAINT BY APPLYING THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF ITS5 ORDINANCES TO THE FACTUAL 
CONDITIONS WHICH PLAINTIFFS ASSERT CONSTITUTE 
VIOLATIONS, AND UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES § 10-9-1002 
DOES NOT APPLY. 
Citing Culbertson v. Bd. of County Commr's of Salt Lake County, 2001 UT 108, 
44 P.3d 642, Plaintiffs argue that § 10-9-1002 simply provides alternative remedies to 
those both allowed and limited by § 10-9-1001. (Pis.5 Br. at 15-21.) However, Plaintiffs5 
argument ignores critical factual distinctions between Culbertson and this case, other case 
law rejecting their argument, and advances an interpretation of the two statutes that would 
render meaningless the 30-day limitations period of § 10-9-1001. 
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In Culbertson, the essence of the Plaintiffs' claims were that a developer was failing 
to comply with conditions imposed by the County through its approval of a site plan and 
conditional use permit ("CUP"). Such claims raised issues independent of decisions 
already made by the County. In fact, as the Court's description indicates, the County had 
largely failed to decide Plaintiffs' claims and enforce the County's approvals: 
Plaintiffs notified Hermes and the County (collectively 
defendants) twice through legal counsel that the Ernst building 
encroached upon 1070 East Street, restricting access to their 
property. They asked the County to enforce the applicable 
ordinances, building codes, and Herme's CUP to stop the 
encroachment and ensure diat 1070 East Street complied with 
county roadway standards. Finally, plaintiffs filed an action 
challenging the adoption of die Ordinance both substantively 
and procedurally and requesting enforcement of county 
roadway standards and the CUP. 
Plaintiffs, after pursuing certain administrative 
remedies, then filed the instant actions alleging that the Ernst 
building and the building labeled "retail 2" (the Future Shop 
building) on the site plan were built in violation of the county 
zoning ordinances, county roadway standards, and the CUP 
because they encroached upon North Union avenue and 1070 
East Street and because the buildings were built without the 
proper setbacks and landscaping. The back wall of the Future 
Shop building was built on die vacated eight-foot-wide strip of 
the former North Union Avenue that ran in front of plaintiffs' 
homes, parallel to the closed twenty-five-foot segment. 
Plaintiffs alleged that these violations deprived them of 
adequate access to their property They prayed for a 
declaration that die buildings violated die above ordinances 
and the CUP and sought to invalidate die roadway standards 
exceptions granted to Hermes by the County. In addition, 
diey petitioned the court to order the County to enforce its 
ordinances and the CUP by removing the offending portions 
of the buildings, and also sought damages by from Hermes. 
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Culbertson at 11H 6, 8, 44 P.3d 642. It is apparent that in Culbertson the only issues 
raised that had been previously decided by the County concerned the roadway standards 
exemptions the County had granted to the developer, which plaintiffs attacked directly 
Id. 
Addressing the application of § 17-27-1001 to plaintiffs5 claims, the Culbertson 
Court held that plaintiffs3 "enforcement53 claims, those requesting the Court to enforce 
County approvals which had not previously been addressed by the County, were not 
subject to the exhaustion of remedies restrictions because plaintiffs were not challenging 
land use "decisions.55 Id at 1111 29-31, 44 P3d 642. The Court went on to analyze the 
roadway standards exemption claims, the claims that had been previously decided, on 
separate grounds entirely. Id at HH 32-34, 44 P.3d 642. As to those claims, the Court 
held that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not necessary because the underlying 
ordinances did not require it. Id 
In this case, by stark contrast, it is significant that prior to Plaintiffs5 "enforcement55 
action, die developer followed die City's ordinances by presenting a proposed site plan to 
City planning staff, to the City Planning Commission, and eventually to the City Council. 
The site plan clearly showed parldng lots within areas Plaintiffs argue have been designated 
as "recreation/open space or preservation areas55 on the City's Land Use Map, and areas 
Plaintiffs argue the MDA requires "should be kept clear of buildings and structures." The 
City then approved the site plan through a full and complete public approval process, 
including public hearings before the City Planning Commission and the City Council. 
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As a factual matter, therefore, the City made a land use "decision53 through its site 
plan review and approval process. It did so pursuant to its ordinances and the MDA and 
thereby decided the very same factual and legal issues Plaintiffs have collaterally attacked 
and asked the Court to decide here. By the same token, Plaintiffs have not claimed that 
the developer has failed to comply with conditions imposed by the site plan approval 
process, or located the parking lots in areas other than where they were expressly 
approved, or failed to landscape the lots, or raised any other issues independent of those 
directly raised in the site plan review and approval process. The Culbertson opinion is 
thus inapposite to Plaintiffs3 argument. 
The inapplicability of the Culbertson opinion to Plaintiffs5 argument is further 
illustrated by a line of decisions construing § 17-27-1001 on facts similar those presented 
here, which Culbertson did not address, all of which support the district court's decision 
that § 10-9-1002 does not simply provide Plaintiffs with an "alternative55 to § 10-9-1001 
by which to attack the City's decision, regardless of whether plaintiffs characterized their 
suits as "enforcement55 actions. Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 392 P2d 40 (Utah 
1964)(challenging building permit which allegedly violated county ordinances); Merrihew 
v. Salt Lake Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 659 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1983)(challenging 
revocation of building permit); Hatch v. Utah County Planning Dep5t., 685 P.2d 550 
(Utah 1984)(challenging denial of building permit). 
In Lund, this Court addressed essentially the same argument Plaintiffs make here. 
There, plaintiff contended that he was not required to exhaust available administrative 
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remedies pursuant to the predecessor to § 17-27-10021 because defendants were in 
violation of the zoning ordinance and accordingly the predecessor section allowed him to 
pursue alternative remedies directly in district court. Lund, 392 P.2d at 42. 
The Court rejected the Lund plaintiffs5 argument. The Court noted that while the 
predecessor section gave a landowner a cause of action in the courts when a violation of a 
zoning resolution is charged, it held that "where, as in this case, the alleged violation of 
the ordinance arose from the administration of a zoning ordinance by an administrative 
officer or agency, as provided in [the predecessor of § 17-27-1001], appeal from that 
administrative ruling should have been taken to the proper administrative tribunal." 392 
P.2d at 42. See also, Merrihew v. Salt Lake Planning & Zoning Common, 659 P.2d 1065, 
1067 (Utah 1983) (reaffirming "the general proposition of law that parties must exhaust 
administrative remedies as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review is applicable to claims 
relating to denial of a building permit. . . . By ignoring a plain, speedy, and adequate 
remedy at law, the plaintiffs placed themselves out of reach of the extraordinary writ of 
mandamus.")(citations omitted). 
More recently, in Bennion v. Sundance Dev. Corp., 897 P.2d 1232 (Utah App. 
1995), the Utah Court of Appeals relied on Lund to reject die arguments Plaintiffs make 
here on virtually identical facts. In Bennion, the Utah County Commission had approved 
}That predecessor section provided that, in the case of a violation or a proposed 
violation of the act, "any owner of real estate within the district in which such building, 
structure of land is situated, may , in addition to other remedies provided by law, institute 
injunction, mandamus, abatement or any other appropriate action or actions35 to prevent 
proposed violations. Lund, 392 P.2d at 42 n.2 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-23). 
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Sundance's Recreational Resort Plat A. Prior to exhausting administrative remedies, 
Plaintiff filed a complaint in district court alleging the plat and Commission's approval 
violated Utah County zoning ordinances and Utah law, and seeking mandamus relief 
ordering the Commission to limit any further approvals of the Sundance plat in violation 
of the ordinances. Bennion, 897 P.2d at 1233-34. 
The district court granted Sundance's motion to dismiss on the grounds plaintiff 
had failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by § 17-27-1001. IcL On 
appeal, plaintiff argued, like Plaintiffs argue here, "that section 17-27-1002 permits him to 
initiate mandamus proceedings against Sundance because Sundance was in actual violation 
of the zoning ordinance, and thus his complaint should not have been dismissed in its 
entirety." Id. at 1237. 
Rejecting this argument, the Court of Appeals followed the Lund opinion, and 
stated: 
[PjlaintifPs complaint is with die Commission's decision that 
the Sundance plat complied with the zoning ordinance. We 
therefore hold that plaintiff was required to appeal that 
decision to the Board. Plaintiff has no separate cause of action 
against Sundance pursuant to section 17-27-1002. 
I d 
Similarly in this case, Plaintiffs' Complaint is with the City Council's decision to 
approve the site plan locating parking lots in areas Plaintiffs claim they should not be 
located under the City's own ordinances. This is a "decision" made under the City's 
ordinances which are promulgated "under authority of [die Municipal Land use 
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Development and Management Act].35 Utah Code Aim. § 10-9-1001. Pursuant to Lund, 
Merrihew, and Bennion, Plaintiffs have no separate cause of action under § 10-9-1002. 
Moreover, this Court will "avoid interpretations that will render portions of a 
statute superfluous or inoperative," Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662 
(Utah 1997), and "attempt to harmonize the provisions in accordance with the legislative 
intent so as to give meaning to each provision." Davis County Solid Waste Management 
v City of Bountiful, 2002 UT 60 11 10, 52 P3d 1174. To hold, on these facts as 
Plaintiffs argue, that § 10-9-1002 simply provides an "alternative55 remedy to that provided 
by § 10-9-1001 would render the limitations period of § 10-9-1001 meaningless. Under 
such an interpretation, anyone claiming a zoning or planning decision violated a city's 
ordinance could file suit at any time, without respect to the availability of more direct 
administrative remedies or the time the decision was made. That is not the implication of 
the CuJbertson decision, nor proper application of the plain language of the statutes to the 
facts in this case.2 
2The two Oregon decisions Plaintiffs cite are similarly inapposite to Plaintiffs5 
argument, and actually support the district court's decision here. In Clackamas County v. 
Marsoa 874 P2d 110 (Or. App. 1994), the Court noted: 
The circuit court enforcement process is available when the 
matter at issue is not subject to the land use decision process 
or susceptible to resolution through a land use decision. 
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more pristine occasion for 
an enforcement action than this case: According to the 
county's allegations, petitioner is conducting a use that violates 
the zoning ordinance, and she has filed no application to allow 
that use or have it declared permissible through a land use 
decision. 
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Nor does it assist Plaintiffs to argue that the City code makes violations of the code 
"a separate offense for each day the violation exists/3 and mandates the City issue a stop 
work order at any time "it determines a use is in violation of the City code." (Pis.5 Br. at 
24-25.) The limitations provision of § 10-9-1001 runs from the time the municipality 
renders a land use "decision/5 not from the time a violation occurs. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-9-1001(2). As a factual matter, it is undisputed that the City decided the very same 
issues raised by Plaintiffs5 Complaint through a comprehensive public approval process 
which was completed on February 14, 2001. The City made no "decisions55 on each day 
Plaintiffs allege a violation exists.3 
II. PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT SHOWN THE SITE PLAN AND ITS 
LOCATION OF PAJUCING LOTS VIOLATES THE CITY'S 
ORDINANCES OR THE MDA. 
As a threshold matter, the Court should not consider Plaintiffs5 arguments on die 
merits because the district court did not reach such arguments in dismissing Plaintiffs5 
Complaint on procedural grounds. The case Plaintiffs rely on, Higgins v. Salt Lake 
Clackamas County, 874 P2d at 112 (emphasis added). Clearly in Clackamas County, the 
county had not previously approve ' ' ' doner's site plan, as is the case here. And in 
Doughton v Douglas County, 750 4 (Or. App. 1988), the plaintiffs5 allegations 
were like those made in Culbertson: "[Plaintiffs] principal argument about the partition 
[of property, which plaintiff challenged] is that respondents have not followed the farm 
management plan upon which he contends the county's approval was conditioned.55 
Doughton, 750 P2d at 1175 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs here make no allegations that 
the developer is not placing the parking lots where they were approved in the site plan. 
3Even if it could be argued the City "decided55 the issues again on or about July 9, 
2001, when it was notified of Plaintiffs5 claims, Plaintiffs did not file suit until October 
2001, well beyond 30 days after the notification. 
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County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993), is inapposite because it involved this Court 
upholding the district court's judgment on grounds not considered by the district court, 
not potentially reversing the district court based on arguments that were moot below. 
In the event the Court does consider Plaintiffs5 arguments, the Court should 
presume the City's decision to approve the parking lots in the areas designated on the site 
plan is valid. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3). Plaintiffs, therefore, bear the burden of 
demonstrating that based on die facts before die City and the ordinances at issue, there is 
no evidence or basis to uphold the City's decision to approve the site plan. L± See also, 
Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P2d 602, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Plaintiffs wholly fail to meet this burden. 
This is tine because the City's ordinances may be read as allowing die parking lots 
in areas designated for "recreation/open space or preservation" under the factual 
circumstances present here. As set forth above, that land use designation does not 
preclude parking lots as an accessory use to uses such as parks, golf courses, equestrian 
parks, etc. The MDA, in turn, provides, in pertinent part: 
All areas within the meander corridor within the River 
Corridor Area shall be designed by the Master Developer or 
Developer(s) to provide for landscaping to the river, paved 
pathways for pedestrians/bicycles, picnic areas, access to the 
Jordan river, wetland areas and other public uses. . . . All 
parking lots developed in conjunction with the Project on any 
portion of the Property or the Peterson Property shall be 
available for public use on weekends and after normal business 
hours. During weekdays, a minimum ten (10) parking spaces 
will be reserved at all times form public use at the north end 
and south end parking lots within the Project. Additional 
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public parking will be permitted on a space available basis 
during regular business hours during the week. 
Thus there is ample evidence supporting a determination that the parking lots in 
the areas designated "recreation/open space or preservation" are, as required by the 
designation, "accessories53 to the permitted use. 
Plaintiffs' other arguments, based on the MDA, are similarly flawed. Plaintiffs rely 
on a provision that cc[a]ll buildings or other improvements shall be located outside of the 
river Corridor Area except as approved in writing by the City and as provided in this 
Agreement," but ignore the fact that the parking lots as located on the site plan have been 
approved in writing. Plaintiffs also rely on the provision that "[t]he open space areas shall 
be kept free and clear of buildings and structures and are for the purpose of providing 
areas for recreation, trails, view areas, drains, canals, wetlands, slope protections, and like 
matters as approved by the City,53 but ignore the fact that City ordinances do not define 
the parking lots at issue as "buildings33 or as "structures.35 
Merely because the City could have come to an alternative conclusion which could 
also be reasonably supported by the record is of no import. The appropriate standard of 
review defers judgment to the City where diere is some evidence in the record to support 
it. The City correctly concluded that the location of parking lots on the site plan 
conformed to City ordinances and the MDA, and that decision should not be overturned 
by the Court, even if Plaintiffs5 challenge was timely filed, which it was not. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the City respectfully requests that this Court 
uphold the district court's well-reasoned decision dismissing Plaintiffs5 Complaint as barred 
by the limitations provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001. The Court should not 
reach the second issue Plaintiffs5 raise, because it was moot and not considered by the 
district court. In the event this Court determines to reach the second issue, it should 
uphold the City's decision approving the site plan and location of the parking lots at issue. 
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